Yemen and the Red Sea
Two wars occupy the same water
Current situation
The Red Sea is again a war theater, not a shipping lane with residual risk. Two wars occupy the same water. One is the Yemeni civil war, reopened at scale in July and now being fought for the Taiz–Mokha road, Hodeidah’s southern districts and the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb. The other is a Houthi campaign, declared on 20 July, to deny Saudi-linked ships and Saudi Red Sea oil infrastructure the use of the sea. Neither has produced a settlement. The Houthis still hold Sanaa, the highlands and a usable stretch of the Red Sea coast. The internationally recognised government still holds Aden, Mokha and the southern approaches. Saudi Arabia still exports crude from Yanbu. What has changed is that those three facts now sit under fire.
Bab el-Mandeb is neither closed nor safe. The Houthis have not sealed the strait to all traffic. They have made Saudi-linked transit, and a widening set of ships they choose to call Saudi, a target. After 20 July, daily transits fell from about 50 ships to about 32 (Kpler). Saudi barrels that used to leave Yanbu south through the strait were pushed north through Suez and the Sumed system, or sent dark. The first confirmed seafarer deaths of this phase came on 11 August, when missiles hit the cargo ship Tihamah off Mokha and a follow-on round killed rescuers. On 24 August a ballistic missile set fire to the Saudi VLCC Amzan 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu — far north of the Houthi shoreline.
On land, a Houthi offensive opened on 3–4 September to cut Taiz from Mokha. Government forces answered in Hais, western Taiz and al-Jawf, and on 7 September a defence-ministry aide said a decision had been taken to retake Sanaa. No timetable followed. The shipping risk and the ground war are now the same campaign.
Actors and objectives
Houthis (Ansar Allah)
Sanaa is trying to keep the capital, to hold enough of the Tihama and the Red Sea coast to threaten Bab el-Mandeb, and to turn that threat into leverage over Riyadh and, through Riyadh, over the war that began against Iran on 28 February. The blockade is framed as “a blockade for a blockade” against the decade-old Saudi restrictions on Yemen. In practice it is also an Iranian-aligned second front: Reuters treated the 20 July embargo as a new chokepoint in that war. The group will not trade the strait for a truce that leaves Saudi aircraft over Yemen and Saudi support to the Aden government intact.
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh is trying to keep Yanbu working as the substitute for Gulf loadings that Hormuz no longer guarantees, to keep Bab el-Mandeb open to its tankers, and to prevent the Houthis from sitting on the Mokha–Bab el-Mandeb approaches. It is rebuilding a maritime coalition and has invited partners to patrol the sea. It will not accept a Houthi veto on Saudi exports, and it will not accept a Houthi advance that puts Mokha and the strait under one command. It has not published a political offer that the Houthis could take.
Yemen (internationally recognised government)
Aden is trying to survive the western-front offensive, to hold the Taiz–Mokha road, and — as of 7 September — to put Sanaa back on the operational agenda. It depends on Saudi air power, money and logistics. It cannot police Bab el-Mandeb alone. Its casualty figures and claims of camps taken are one side of the ledger; they are not a map of control.
United States
Washington is a secondary actor in this theater and a primary one in the war that made it matter. The Red Sea is where an Iranian partner can tax the workaround that Saudi Arabia built after Hormuz was contested. The United States wants the strait open and the Houthis unable to dictate terms to Saudi exports. It has not made Yemen the centre of the February war, and it has not put a new Prosperity Guardian-scale campaign on the record for this phase.
Iran
Tehran does not command Houthi brigades day to day. It supplies the missiles, the drones, the targeting logic and the timing. A second chokepoint, used while Hormuz is already a bargaining chip, is the cheapest way to make the American blockade of Iranian ports a two-theatre problem. Iran will not order the Houthis off the sea in exchange for a pause that leaves that blockade standing.
Key issues
Bab el-Mandeb is the Houthis' lever, not a declared closed gate
What counts is not the statement of the day — blockade, or not — but whether Saudi-linked tankers transit in daylight with AIS on, whether projectile strikes keep being logged, and whether the Houthis can hit as far north as Yanbu. They can. Amzan shows the campaign is no longer confined to the strait. Chinese and other third-party ships have continued to exit with Saudi crude under arrangements the Houthis describe as clearances. That is a filter, not an open sea.
Yanbu is now the Saudi vulnerability that Hormuz used to be
After February, Riyadh pushed the bulk of seaborne crude west to Yanbu — on the order of 3–4 million barrels a day in June, against a much smaller west-coast baseline the year before. The 20 July embargo was aimed at that workaround. Loadings went dark. Ship-trackers then diverged on the weekly number, which is itself the finding. A route that has to hide to work is already degraded. Hits on Jizan and claimed hits on Yanbu facilities sit on the same list as hits on tankers.
The land war is a fight for the strait's shore
The 3–4 September offensive was not a local Taiz flare-up. Its geometry is the Taiz–Mokha road, Hais and al-Jarahi in southern Hodeidah, and the ground that looks at Mokha and Bab el-Mandeb. The Houthis are trying to operate at once against Saudi shipping, against the Aden government and in service of Iran’s wider war. The government’s answer in al-Jawf — the camp at al-Lubnat, talk of Sanaa — is an attempt to make Sanaa defend two directions. If Mokha is isolated, the strait becomes a Houthi shore battery with a port behind it. If al-Jawf opens, Sanaa has to look north-east instead of west. Neither outcome has arrived.
Targeting error is part of the method
The Houthis said Tihamah was a Saudi military ship. The Yemeni government said it was an Egyptian-owned cargo carrier with food. Wires recorded a projectile and casualties. Six people died, including rescuers in a second round. On 17 August they fired on what they called a Saudi landing ship off Mokha; reporting identified the Amir Khan, a Yemeni-owned deck cargo ship laid up empty. A blockade that kills the wrong ship still moves hulls off the route. Insurers had already widened the high-risk zone in late July.
This theater exists because Hormuz was contested first
The 2023–25 campaign against Israel-linked shipping taught the Houthis the weapon set. The 28 February war taught Saudi Arabia that the Gulf loading system could not be relied on. The Red Sea became the alternative. The Houthis then taxed the alternative. A settlement that reopens Hormuz and leaves Bab el-Mandeb under Houthi fire still leaves Saudi exports and the Suez–Asia trade inside a missile envelope. The two straits are now one problem with two addresses.
What to watch
Bab el-Mandeb and the northern Red Sea
UKMTO and JMIC incident notices; AIS dark tracks out of Yanbu; Kpler or equivalent daily transit counts; whether another VLCC is hit north of Jeddah; whether the Houthis name a ship they allowed through.
Yanbu and Jizan
Loadings that reappear on AIS versus loadings that stay dark; confirmed fires or intercepts at the terminals; statements from Bahri; whether the Greek Patriot battery at Yanbu engages again.
Mokha–Taiz–Hais
Who holds the Taiz–Mokha road at the end of each week; whether Hais stays with the government; artillery and missile fire into Mokha port; any Houthi presence that can see Bab el-Mandeb with line of sight rather than with a missile only.
Sanaa and al-Jawf
Whether the 7 September “decision” produces a named axis, a named unit and a named town beyond al-Hazm; Saudi or government air activity over Sanaa; Houthi claims of prison and city strikes that can be geolocated.
The coalition and the escorts
Which of the states that answered Riyadh’s July invitation actually put a hull in the sea; whether Combined Maritime Forces or a Saudi-led grouping logs an intercept; whether Washington treats a strike on a Saudi tanker as an attack on a partner or as Yemeni background.
The Iranian link
IRGC or Houthi language that ties a Red Sea shot to a strike on Iran; any pause in Houthi fire that arrives on the same day as a Hormuz pause.
Envoys travelling is not the indicator.
How we got here
Nov 2023 – 2025
After Gaza, the Houthis open a campaign against Israel-linked and then wider commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Traffic falls. Escorts gather. The group learns the range of its missiles, drones and boats against moving ships.
28 Feb 2026
The United States and Israel open a direct war with Iran. Hormuz becomes a contested strait. Saudi Arabia shifts crude west to Yanbu. Bab el-Mandeb turns from a damaged lane into the kingdom’s main way out to Asia.
13 Jul 2026 – 20 Jul 2026
A Saudi-linked incident at Sanaa airport is followed by Houthi fire at Abha and then, on 20 July, by a maritime embargo on Saudi ports and Saudi-linked ships. Tankers reverse off Bab el-Mandeb. Brent moves back above $100.
21 Jul 2026 – 10 Aug 2026
The embargo becomes shooting. Tankers are fired on in the southern Red Sea. Jizan and Yanbu are claimed as targets. Riyadh talks up a maritime coalition. Insurers widen the high-risk zone. Transit through the strait settles at a lower daily count. Yanbu loadings go dark.
11 Aug 2026 – 24 Aug 2026
Tihamah is hit off Mokha; six people are killed, the first seafarer deaths of this phase since 28 February. Amir Khan is struck at the quay. On 24 August Amzan is hit off Yanbu. The campaign now covers the length of the Saudi Red Sea coast, not only the strait.
03 Sept 2026 – present
The Houthis open their largest ground offensive in years toward the Taiz–Mokha road and the Hais–Jarahi line. The government answers in western Taiz, Hais and al-Jawf, says it has taken the al-Lubnat camp, and talks of Sanaa. The sea denial and the war for the capital are now run as one fight. There are still no concessions in either direction.